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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BENCHMARK, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SALT LAKE VALLEY MENTAL
HEALTH BOARD, INC., a Utah
corporation, and SALT LAKE
COUNTY, a political entity,

Case No,

910393

Defendants/Appellants.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff/appellee Benchmark has petitioned the court to
rehear one specific aspect of the court's decision on defendants'
Motion for Summary Disposition.

That one aspect is the court's

- 1-

ruling that damages, if any, are limited to $40,000.00 plus six
months' rent.

Benchmark's petition attempts to divide that one

ruling into two issues, namely, one of contract ambiguity and one
of

law

concerning

agreements.
subjects

the effect

of termination

notices

on

lease

In actuality, in this case those are not two separate

but

really

are part and parcel

However, they will be addressed

of the same subject.

separately

for the purpose of

responding specifically to Benchmark's petition.

THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE CONTRACT
WHICH WOULD MAKE IT SUBJECT TO PAROL EVIDENCE
Benchmark

has

argued

that

the

termination

clause

in

question is ambiguous because it could have two possible meanings
and

therefore

explored.

the parties' intent would

need

to be

factually

That claim is somewhat ironic since it was Benchmark who

initially argued there were no material issues of fact in this case
and that, as a consequence, it was entitled to Summary Judgment as
a matter of law.

Benchmark is now saying the contract is ambiguous

and that there are issues of fact remaining to be decided by the
court.
As was noted in defendants/appellants' original Motion
for Summary Disposition, the contract term is not ambiguous.
intent of the parties is clear.
- 2 -

The

The ambiguity that Benchmark

attempts to raise is in reality two different legal approaches to
the contract rights contained within the subject clause.

As was

noted in defendants' original Motion, some courts take the position
that a breach occurs when the notice of termination has not been
given as exactly provided in the contract. Nonetheless, even under
that interpretation, damages are limited to the amount which would
have been obtained if the proper notice had been given.

The second

theory is that there is no breach but rather the defective notice
is constructively deemed to extend to the proper time called for
in the contract.

The point is, under either theory the end result

is exactly the same.
In

the

instant

case,

defendants

claimed

that

they

terminated the lease "for cause." This issue has now been remanded
to the trial court for a factual determination.
also

claim

that

at

"without cause."

the very

least

they

The defendants

terminated

the

lease

If defendants are correct that they terminated

the lease for cause, the damage limitation issue is moot.

On the

other hand, if it is determined, that defendant Salt Lake Mental
Health did not terminate for cause, then the damage limitation
issue is relevant.
The issue at hand is created by the fact that the Lease
allowed termination without cause upon six (6) months notice.

If

notice was given, then the Lease was terminated and future rent
- 3 -

waived except for six (6) months rent plus a portion of Benchmark's
remodeling

costs, not to exceed

$40,000.

The defendants

gave

notice of termination on October 31, 1989 with a termination date
of January 1, 1990.

Benchmark claims that the failure of the

defendants to give a full six (6) months notice means the lease is
still in full force and effect.

Thus, the damage would be the rent

for the remaining term of the Lease.

The defendants maintain that

the fact that the notice did not give a full six (6) months notice
does not affect the damage limitation provision of the Lease and
damages are at most six (6) months rent plus $40,000.00.
Where a tenant gives a notice to terminate a lease but
does not give the sufficient time period, some courts hold that
the measure of damages would be the damages to which the landlord
would have been entitled had the proper notice been given.

Hence,

the damages are limited to rent for the termination period and any
other contractual damages.

In the case at bar, this amount would

be six (6) months rent plus the $40,000.00. Other courts would say
that in such a case the defective termination notice is construed
to take effect at the end of the full six months.

In application

of either line of cases, the damages are limited to $40,000.00,
plus six months of rent.
taken,

the

clause

remains

Regardless of which legal position is
the

same and

does

not

present

different factual interpretations as to what it means.
- 4 -

two

Benchmark

argues

that

giving

proper

notice

condition precedent to the limitation of damages".
Petition for Rehearing, p.4.
application of law.

"is

a

Benchmark's

That is clearly an argument of the

It is not evidence of a factual ambiguity in

the contract's terms. Moreover, defendants submit that Benchmark's
interpretation is even bad law, as will be discussed more fully
hereinafter.
This court has the clause before it.

The court can see

for itself that the language is clear and unambiguous.

In fact

Benchmark has not even suggested how parol evidence would change
the interpretation.

The only differences in interpretation relate

to different legal theories.

There is thus no basis for parol

evidence to be introduced to interpret that language since the
intent of the parties is not in question.

See, e.g., Ron Case

Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomguist, 773 P. 2d 1382 (Utah
1989); Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah

1981).

THE LIMITATION ON DAMAGES SET BY THIS COURT SHOULD STAND
Benchmark

contends

that

the

cases

cited

by

defendants/appellants in their Motion for Summary Disposition are
employment cases and that somehow employment cases enjoy a special
rule regarding termination notices, which rule is not applicable
to interpretating termination rights in leases.
- 5 -

Benchmark is in

error on both points. Osborn v. Commanche Cattle Industries, Inc.,
545

P. 2d

827

(Okl.

App.

1975)

involved

maintenance of certain feedlot facilities.

a

contract

for

the

It was not a case of

an employer and an employee but rather two separate businesses
engaged in a contract.

Likewise in Shain v. Washington National

Insurance Co., 308 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1962),

the parties were an

insurance

The

company

and

a

general

agent.

general

agent

complained about the termination of his agency agreement, i.e., his
business, not about the termination of his employment.

Further,

the court in Shain made it clear that the principle they were
applying was valid, regardless of the type of contract:
And it is the general rule that where a contract, whether
it be one for employment or for insurance or of a
different kind, requires written notice of cancellation
upon a stated time, a notice failing to meet the time
requirement, but otherwise appropriate, is nonetheless
effective upon the lapse of the time required by the
contract.
Id. at. 614. Emphasis added.

Perhaps

the

better

question

to

ask

is

whether

the

landlord/tenant relationship is so different from other types of
contracts

that

relationship

a

would

rule
not

which
be

relationship or vice versa.

might

applicable

be
to

applicable
any

other

to

that

contract

The argument raised by Benchmark is

that an employment relationship does not contemplate substantial
- 6 -

capital expenditures and hence strict compliance with a termination
notice is "less significant in an employment action."
Petition for Rehearing, p.9.
financial

Benchmark's

That comment ignores the substantial

commitment an employee may make

location to take a specific

job.

in moving

to a new

It also fails to note that

Benchmark's bargain with defendants was that at any time the lease
was terminated by the tenants without cause, the landlord would be
entitled to six months of rent plus a percentage of the remodeling
costs, not to exceed $40,000.00.

With that type of a guarantee,

Benchmark would presumably be able to have sufficient rent and
monies to cover any potential loss if defendants left the premises
early.
Most importantly, that argument by Benchmark has been
nullified

by

this

court

recently

when

it

declared

that

landlord/tenant law is to be governed by general principles of
contract
1991).

law.

Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d

1006, 1010, 1015

(Utah

Thus the attempt by Benchmark to claim special provisions

of law applicable to this case because it involves a lease is
without foundation in the law.
The number of cases supporting the principles enunciated
in both the Osborn case and the Shain case is impressive.

The

following cases follow the rule annunciated in Shain that if the
notice is deficient, it will be construed by the court to extend
- 7 -

to the period which would have been sufficient under the contract
terms.

Interestingly

enough,

many

of

these

cases

involve

& Buckley-Madison,

Inc. v.

landlord/tenant disputes over lease terminations.
In

the

case

of

Camalier

Madison Hotel, Inc., 513 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the issue was
whether a landlord's notice to quit was sufficient, since it did
not give the full five days required by the lease.

The court held

that if there was a deficiency, the court would extend the notice
to the proper day and assess damages up to that proper day.
See also Raynor v. Burroughs Corp. , 294 F.Supp. 238 (E.D.
Va. 1968); All States Service Station, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,
120 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Medical Professional Bldg Corp. v.
Ferrell, 131 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App. 1939) (90 day termination notice
in lease); Worthinqton v. Moreland Motor Truck Co., 140 Wash. 528,
25 0 Pac. 3 0 (19 26) (month to month tenancy); G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd.
v. Helena Rubenstein, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 561, 393 N.E.2d 460 (1979);
Entis v. Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F. 2d 759 (2nd Cir. 1964).
The following cases, like Osborn, limit the damages to
those which would have been recovered if the proper termination
notice had been given.

See, e.g., Cottman v. State, Dept. of

Natural Resources, 51 Md. App. 380, 443 A.2d 638 (1982) (breach of
lease damages limited to those incurred during termination period);
W.K. Ewing Co. v. New York State Teachers Retirement Sys. , 197
- 8 -

N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. App. 1960); Pecarovich v. Becker, 248 P.2d 123
(Cal. App. 1952) .
Interestingly enough, none of the cases which extend the
defective termination to the proper period have ever commented on
the cases which call for strict enforcement of the termination
notice provisions but then limit the damages.

The same is true of

the damage cases in commenting on the cases which have applied the
so-called erroneous date rule.

For whatever reason this is, the

important aspect is that they basically reach the same result.

It

is also clear that they are the majority position with respect to
an at-will termination clause in any type of contract.
Although to the best knowledge of defendants there is no
specific Utah case on point, the issue is not really one of first
impression in Utah.

Utah law on contract damages

limits damages to the amount bargained for.

specifically

Young Elec. Sign Co.

v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P. 2d 162 (Utah 1988).

Thus

where the contract provided that the tenant could terminate at
will, then the measure of damages is that provided in the lease for
such early termination and not the lease payments over the rest of
the term of the lease.

Accord, Dalton Properties, Inc. v. Jones,

100 Nev. 422, 683 P.2d 30 (1984).

In the present case, the limit

of Benchmark's damages have also been contractually
defendants

could

terminate

at

any

- 9 -

time

and

set.

The

the maximum

that

defendants would have to pay was $40,000.00 plus the six months
rent (and of course would have to pay nothing if there was cause
for the termination).
The reference by Benchmark to Reid v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins, Co. , 776 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1989) is misleading and not applicable
to the issues in this case.

Even Benchmark admits in its Petition

for Rehearing that in Reid, there was no right by the tenant to
terminate at will.

Hence, there was no termination clause which

had to be interpreted and no right of the tenant to reduce the
amount

of

rent

owed

through

use

of

the

termination

clause.

Therefore, the ruling in that case that the rental for the entire
period was owing is completely understandable.
application to this case.

Reid simply has no

If there was no termination at will

clause in the instant case, the parties would not even be arguing
this point and this court would not have ruled as it did.

It is

precisely because there is such an at will termination clause that
the issue of limitation of damages is before the court.
Benchmark has also cited to the court three cases which
it claims speak for the proposition that if a termination notice
is not given as specifically prescribed in the contract, then there
is a breach and the damages run for the full period of the lease.
At best, the cases cited by Benchmark are in the minority. Further,
the case of Deschenes v. Conqel, 149 Vt. 579, 547 A.2d 1344 (1988)
- 10 -

can easily be distinguished from the instant case.

In that case

not only did the tenant not give the proper termination notice, but
the tenant then sublet the premises and through that subtenant
continued occupation of the premise for the remainder of the lease
term.

The Vermont court followed the line of cases that hold a

failure to give proper termination notice does not invoke the
termination clause. However the court did not get to the remaining
portion of that line of cases which limits the damages to that
which would otherwise have been applicable, because the tenant
continued in possession.
ruled

that

the

rent

Thus the court in that case properly

would

continue

during

that

period

of

possession.
The cases of National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co.
v. 4010 Washington, Inc., 434 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. App. 1968) and A.
Dubois & Son, Inc. v. Goldsmith Bros., 273 App. Div. 306, 77 N.Y.S.
2d 473 (1948), appear to have required a strict notice compliance
and no limitations on damages.

However, both cases were from the

intermediate appellate court level and neither have been cited on
this proposition in any subsequent cases.

Moreover, Dubois does

not appear to be good law in New York, as is evident from the more
recent case of G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc.,
47 N.Y.2d 561, 393 N.E.2d 460 (1979), which is a decision by the

- 11 -

highest state court in New York, and which clearly follows the
erroneous date rule.

CONCLUSION
When defendants gave their notice of termination, they
believed that they were entitled to terminate for cause.

This

court has determined that that remains a factual issue for which
this case has been remanded to the trial court.

Benchmark would

require defendants to forfeit their right to the limitation on
damages which they could invoke at any time by giving six months
notice, because they sought to terminate for cause.
Agreement

specifically

provided

defendants

with

the

The Lease
right

of

immediate termination for cause as well as the right of termination
at

will

upon

six

months

notice.

Since

the

two

rights

of

termination do not require the same notice periods, the Lease had
to contemplate that a termination notice

for cause would

also

invoke the longer notice period required for termination at will.
Thus, if the termination for cause were not upheld, at the very
least the termination at will clause would come into play.

That

is the position of the law as well.
The six months rent plus $40,000.00 cap was agreed to by
Benchmark.

It knew that at any time defendants could terminate and

- 12 -

pay limited damages.

This court should continue to sustain that

limitation and deny the Petition by Benchmark,
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this^P^day of March, 1992.
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